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Abstract
In this paper, we study the e!ect of di!erent "nancial contracts on the "rm's inventory policy. Doing so will allow to
de"ne the best "nancial instruments to diminish the stock variability of a pro"t-maximizing "rm in a given economic
environment (expansion or recession), and for a given market structure. We show that in periods of recession (expansion),
reducing (increasing) the amount of short-term debt is an optimal strategy independently of the market struc-
ture.  2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
This paper studies the impact of product di!er-
entiation and "nancial structure on "rms' inven-
tory policy. This type of analysis is supposed
to deliver a global perspective on the interaction
between input and output markets, and the dynam-
ics of "rms' inventories. We believe that this is
a relevant question insofar the variability of "rms'
stocks is recognized to be one of the driving forces
of business cycle #uctuations.
In order to give a broad idea of this phenom-
enon, Blinder and Maccini [1] "nd that up to 87%
of GDP variance during short-term (ST henceforth)
recessions is linked with drastic inventory reduc-
tions. Other sources "nd that as much as 11% of
Chinese GDP is stored in stocks. From these pieces
E-mail address: joatribo@emp.uc3m.es (J.A. TriboH ).
See also The Economist, 1999, April 24th, `The Economics
of Inventoriesa.
 `China's Inventory Problema in The Wall Street Journal,
1997, April 14th.
of evidence we can understand the rationale for
a Central Authority to give incentives to pro"t-
maximizing "rms for smoothing their steep inven-
tory disinvestment (investment) in recessions (ex-
pansions). Hendel [2] links this issue with "rms
liquidity needs in the ST. Firms tend to increase
their cash reserves through an aggressive stock
disinvestment in order to satisfy ST "nancial obli-
gations. In this perspective, it is an issue of interest
to study the "rms' interaction between inventory
policy and their "nancial structure. Other studies
such as Carpenter et al. [3], Kashyap et al. [4] and
Olney [5] "nd a stronger impact of cyclical #uctu-
ations on small "rms' inventory variability than on
that of bigger "rms. These authors link this result
to the fact that smaller "rms can only obtain
external funds through credits with ST maturities.
On the other hand, larger "rms can also obtain
long-term (LT henceforth) "nancing (LT debt or
equity).
Here we propose a model in which "rms are
hit by both economy-wide supply-side and
economy-wide demand-side shocks. Focusing on
0925-5273/01/$ - see front matter  2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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The quantities B

and B

result in imposing a lender zero-
pro"t condition on the corresponding ¸¹ funds raised in the
past, as well as all S¹ funds raised in the present, respectively.
Although we only analyze one period, there are others,
otherwise "rms would not store stocks. We introduce these
other periods in "rm pro"ts function through "rm valuation of
end-of-the period inventories, n

. By simplicity, I have assumed
a linear function (n

).
economy-wide shocks allows us to avoid aggrega-
tion issues among di!erent markets subject to
idiosyncratic shocks. Furthermore, economy-
wide shocks are those which trigger expansions or
recessions.
In our setup, "rms compete in a monopolistic
competitive market, designing their inventory pol-
icy as a pro"t maximizing function of their "nancial
structure, the shocks, and the market structure. We
consider di!erent "nancial contracts that link "rms
with their fund providers. This allows us to study
the e!ect of di!erent "nancial instruments (debt or
equity) with di!erent lenders (banks or market) on
a pro"t-maximizing "rm's stock policy under alter-
native market structures. Such an analysis has nor-
mative implications for a Central Authority that
would a!ect "rms' "nancial structure as a way
to smooth inventory #uctuations and ultimately,
cyclical #uctuations.
Four main results are obtained in our model.
First, the impact of product market di!erentiation
on inventory investment is such that, in expansions,
the inventory variance increases as markets become
more fragmented, and vice versa in recessions. Sec-
ond, regarding the role of "rms "nancial structure,
we prove that market debt-"nanced "rms store
a lower inventory level than bank debt-"nanced
"rms, which in turn accumulate less than equity-
"nanced "rms. Third, the higher (lower) the
amount of ST debt in expansions (recessions), the
lower stock #uctuations in expansions (recessions)
for a pro"t-maximizing "rm. This in turn implies
that "rms using variable-rate credit de"ne
a smoother inventory policy than "rms using
"xed-rate credits. Finally, we describe a possible
mechanism that would provide pro"t-maximizing
"rms with cheap "nancing and at the same time
smooth their inventory accumulation policy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section
2 sketches our basic model. In Section 3 we solve
the model and present our main "ndings. Section
4 concludes.
2. The basic model
We consider a one-period model populated with
two agents. (i) A representative "rm that follows
a pro"t-maximizing policy and accumulates inven-
tories as residuals. (ii) Lenders, who compete in
order to provide the "rm with the required external
funds,E, at the beginning of the period. These funds
can be obtained making use of debt or equity. We
assume feasibility, in the sense that the "rm can
raise all the external funds it needs. Lenders there-
fore play a passive role in our model, that simply
consists in recovering their capital. Let B denote
the "rm's debt payment obligations at the end of
the period. This value is composed by some inherit-
ed past LT debt, to be returned at the end of
the period considered, B

, as well as the current
one-period debt, B

.
The representative "rm is producing in a monop-
olistic competitive market, composed by a large
number of "rms, facing each a stochastic inverse
demand function p

"a!bq

!(1!b)QK , where
i indexes the generic "rm, and QK refers to
the industry average output. The parameter a is an
economy-wide stochastic variable, independently
and identically distributed with a uniform distribu-
tion over an interval [a

, a ]. The parameter b rises
with the degree of product di!erentiation. As
b tends to 1, the product market evolves from
competitive to monopolistic. Firms face a stochas-
tic marginal production cost, c , subject to an econ-
omy-wide shock  that follows an independent
distribution function uncorrelated with demand
shocks a . We assume a constant marginal storage
cost A, and we consider the possibility of inheriting
backlogs from the past. That is, in every period,
"rm's stocks may also be negative. We make
a "rst-order analysis, and, similarly as for produc-
tion costs, we consider a pro"t function where the
marginal bene"t to store stocks is constant ().
This  value can be interpreted as an entrepreneur
stock shadow price. We are going to relate this
with the proportion of "rm's long-length "nancial
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Condition n

#y!(a!

)/(1#b)*0 ensures that pro-
duction y is high enough to eliminate all possible backlogs, even
if demand is maximum (a

"a ).
obligations as well as the type of lender. Firms are
capacity bounded to produce a y amount, with
y*(a!

)/(1#b)!n

 where n

is the "rm's
initial stock level, and 

is the initial value of .
There are two types of debt lenders: banks and
the market. Bank debt is more easy to renegotiate
than market debt is. Thus, once a "rm cannot
satisfy its cash payments, banks, unlike the market,
permit payment with a transference of inventory
rights to be transformed in cash in the near future.
This fact has two consequences in entrepreneur
stock shadow price . First, in a bank-"nanced
"rm,  is higher than in a market-"nanced "rm.
Second, the inventory shadow price for a bank,
, is higher than for the market, 	. In par-
ticular, for simplicity we "x 	"0, as we have
assumed that market debt cannot be paid selling
inventory rights, and ".
It is well documented in the literature [6] that
the higher the proportion of a "rms' long-length
"nancial instrument, the higher the "rms' invest-
ment, and, in particular, inventory investment. We
model this fact by considering a high-stock
`shadow pricea  in those scenarios in which
a "rm's "nancing is based on LT "nancial instru-
ments. Inventories in the medium term could easily
be transformed in cash in order to attain the re-
quired LT debt payments. In addition, inventories
can be used as collateral to extend the length (roll
over), when necessary, of today's LT credits. Both
facts positively correlate the size of the LT debt
(both historical and from the current period) with .
To summarize,  is higher for bank debt-"nanced
"rms, and especially if it is long-term debt.
Timing of events
* F * 0 * 1 *
At time F, the "nancing stage, the entrepreneur
borrows an amount E of funds in a competitive
credit market, using di!erent instruments (bank
debt, market debt or equity). In the case of debt
"nancing, the "nancial contract designed estab-
lishes a collateral that includes "rm's stocks, and
a payment obligation B. As above, we assume feasi-
bility, i.e. "rms obtains all the funds they need.
At time 0 there is a supply shock, 

, that deter-
mines the marginal production costs, c

, for the
period considered. The entrepreneur, once ob-
tained the funds E, chooses production y

, taking
into account c

, the "rm's initial stock level, n

, the
initial value of  (

), and the expected period-one
demand shock, a

.
At the end of the period (time 1), the demand
shock a

is realized. The entrepreneur decides how
much to sell (q

) and satis"es his or her ST debt
payments B. Otherwise, lenders take the control of
the "rm and liquidate the collateral, which included
the "rm's stocks.
3. Solving the model
The "rm inherits a particular "nancial structure
from the past, based on equity and debt. We distin-
guish two "nancing scenarios: bank debt and mar-
ket debt. In the "rst (second) situation the "rm
raises funds in the period studied, by means of bank
(market) debt, that can be LT or ST, as well as
issuing equity. We also contemplate a pure equity
"nancing framework, with no debt claims (B"0).
Our objective is to study the xrm's inventory yuctu-
ations,measured substracting the average xnal inven-
tory level, n(

from the initial level n

, under diwerent
xnancing scenarios and market structures. Although
this might not be a fully comprehensive dexnition of
inventory yuctuations, it is the only one that is feasible
in a one-period model.
3.1. Bank debt xnancing
Under this scenario, the "rm obtains funds in the
current period by means of bank debt (ST or LT),
and additionally, if so, with equity (selling its own
shares in the "nancial market, or making a share
issue). This implicitly de"nes the "rm's stock
shadow price for the period, 

, which is positively
correlated with debt length. We assume that when-
ever the "rm's `liquida pro"ts (excluding 

n

from
the pro"t function of Eq. (1)) are lower than ST
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The region a

(X

is not considered because in this case
the entrepreneur loses the "rm's property rights.
This de"nition of 

makes its maximum amount equal
to 

.
We consider 

independent of c

. This is a consequence of
assuming that c follows an independent distribution over di!er-
ent periods. If we were allowed some correlation between a and
c , then, in periods of expansion, a reduction in c

would have to
be accompanied by a rise in 

, this being the opposite in
a period of recession.
This corner solution is not maintained when we consider
non-linear cost functions like C"

cy. In that case, y

would
have been an interior solution
 In fact it is only required that n

((a!

)/(1#b),n

.
claims, B, the bank, accepts compensation acquir-
ing senior rights over the remaining stocks without
triggering a liquidation of the collateral. This fact
makes liquidity consideration for bank-"nanced
"rms less relevant than for market-"nanced "rms,
who cannot satisfy their payments by transferring
inventory rights.
To solve the model, we "rst compute the "rm's
sales at the end of the period (q

), once the demand
shock a

is known. Two cases can be distinguished.
When a

is low, the entrepreneur cannot ful"ll
bank payments, even by transferring inventory
rights, thus losing the "rm's control, with a
consequent liquidation of all the existences
(q

"n

#y

). When a

is high, the entrepre-
neur maximizes the pro"t function at t"1 (<

):
Max

<

,R

!c

y

!An

#

n

!B, (1)
where R

,[a

!bq

!(1!b)QK ]

denotes
"rst-period revenues, and n

"n

#y

!q

denotes the stock level at the end of the period.
This gives the solution
q

"


if X

)a

,
n

#y

if a

(X

,
(2)
where X

is a threshold value for a

such that
<

[a

"X

]"0.
(X

!

)!(1!b)(X

!

)QK
#(1#b)(

y

!(A!

)n

!B)"0. (3)
To derive this expression, we have to substitute
"rms sales policy (2) in Eq. (1) and impose <

"0.
This expression is simpli"ed once we assume a
symmetric solution q

"QK . This is the case
because we are dealing with the market representa-
tive "rm.
Note that in the case of no liquidation (a

*X

),
sales decrease with 

. Stocks become more valu-
able for the entrepreneur and he or she is more
willing to accumulate inventories by reducing sales.
The standard result over the positive correlation
between the degree of market competitiveness
(b low) and sales is also found. To compute the
"rm's production, y

, we maximize "rm expected
pro"t function at time t"0, (<

):

Max

<

,

	
R

!c

y

!An

#

n

!Bda
a
. (4)
In point (1) of the appendix the optimal production
policy is derived:
y

" 1


Max0, 

y with 

,

!c

. (5)
As a matter of convention, we de"ne an expan-
sionwhen 

*0 and a recessionwhen 

(0. The
intuition is that in an expansion the entrepreneur
outweighs the marginal production bene"t (

) with
the marginal production costs (c

), and vice versa
in a recession.
The optimal production policy is rather extreme.
If c

)

, it is optimal for the "rm to produce at
full capacity (y ). If c

'

, the null production
y"0 is the best alternative for the "rm. When
n

is low, and the demand is high enough, then,
some backlogs can be generated in a recession.
These backlogs will be eliminated in future 

-
positive periods, once "rms produce y (as we have
assumed y*(a!

)/(1#b)!n

). Finally, a pos-
itive correlation between y

and 

is found, which
is consistent with the sales reduction, as an inven-
tory increasing strategy as 

rises. This contrasts
with Glazer's [7] result. There, LT debt induces
a collusive agreement between oligopolistic "rms,
which restrain their production. This e!ect cannot
be contemplated in our non-strategic model.
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This term is not present when there is an exclusive equity
"nancing. In that case as B"0, we can ensure that X

"a

.
This condition ensures that in a period of recession, the
initial stock n

is high enough to satisfy the demand for the
threshold level, X

, to maintain the control of the "rm by the
entrepreneur.
Expression (8) is equivalent to the X

de"nition for the
bank "nancing scenario (3), but without including the term n

in the "rm pro"t function, that is <

[X

]!n

"0
The Z

threshold value is obtained under the condition
that `liquida pro"ts be higher than B, and making use of sales
policy (9).
Computing n(

!n

,nY , we obtain
n(" 1
(a!a

)!n (X!a )
#

	
	y!
a

!

1#b da. (6)
The term !n

(X

!a

)/(a!a

) accounts for
the stock liquidation when the lender takes "rm
control and sells all the inventories.
Proposition 1. Assuming n

high enough (n

*
n[X

],(X

!

)/(1#b)), and y high enough
(n

#y*n,(a!

)/(1#b)), we xnd that exclus-
ively equity-xnanced xrms (B"0) store a higher
inventory level than bank-debt xnanced xrms. Con-
cerning market structure, in a recessive (expansive)
period, the more monopolistic (competitive) a market,
the lower a xrm's stock variation. Once the xrm is
xnanced with a proportion of bank debt as well as
equity, the higher the xrm's ST debt (B), the higher
(lower) the xrm's stock variation in recessions (expan-
sions). Furthermore, a rise in market's 

(inversely
related with ST debt), decreases (increases) stock vari-
ation in recessive (expansive) periods.
Proof. See point (2) in the appendix.
In the so-called recessive framework, the "rm's
null production makes inventory policy identical to
sales policy. As sales are higher in competitive mar-
kets, it is reasonable to predict larger stock #uctu-
ations under this market structure in recessions.
Concerning the in#uence of a "rm's debt liabilities
on its inventory policy, the lower a "rm's ST debt
obligations, modeled by a low B or a high propor-
tion of long-length instruments with regard to ST
debt (high 

), the higher a "rm's stock investment.
This leads to a reduced inventory variation in the
null-production periods, and a higher stock vari-
ation in the full-capacity production periods. This
dynamics of high inventory investment is exacer-
bated once "rms have no debt liabilities (pure
equity-"nanced "rms).
3.2. Market debt xnancing
This "nancial scheme is symmetric to the pre-
vious one, with the only di!erence that "rms can-
not use inventories as a way of payment of their
"nancial obligations. Thus, 	"0. Moreover,
we can consider that a market debt-"nanced
"rm's  is lower than a bank debt-"nanced "rm's .
Both facts make liquidity considerations very rel-
evant in this "nancing scenario. Hendel [2] reports
several examples of "rms that have strongly re-
duced their inventories to "t their S¹ "nancial
obligations. This is an expression of what we call
liquidity ewect.
3.2.1. Sales policy
To characterize the optimal sales policy, we have
to distinguish three cases:
(1) If "rst-period demand shocks are high
enough, so that the "rm's `liquida pro"ts (de"ned
above) are higher than ST "nancial obligations B.
In this case the sales policy is equivalent to that
found under the bank-"nancing scenario
q

"a!
1#b if X)a , (7)
(X

!

)(X

#b

)!(1!b)(X

!

)QK
!(1#b)[c

y

#An

#B]"0. (8)
(2) For medium-size "rst-period shocks
(Z

(a

(X

), the entrepreneur wants to ob-
tain the maximum amount of cash in order to keep
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 It is straightforward to compute
H

"

[1! 
 	  	
	M  

],
where the value of X

is given by expression (8). Note that our
assumption of n

*n[X
M 
]NH

*0.

 In fact both conditions are related, as the higher is ST debt
(high B), the lower is the proportion of LT debt to ST debt (low


). In point 3 in the appendix is shown B and 

must ensure

y

/
X

"[1/(1#b)](1#

a!2X

/

(

!

))(0.
This can be accomplished if B is high and 

is low.
his or her control of the "rm. He or she maximizes
the `liquida pro"t function:
q

" a
1#b if Z)a(X , (9)
Z

!(1!b)Z

QK !(1#b)[c

y

#An

#B]
"0. (10)
(3) If a

(Z

, the lender takes over the "rm's
control and liquidates all the stocks
Two points are worth mentioning here. First, for
medium-size "rst-period shocks (Z

)a

(X

),
"rms do not sell the optimal level
q"(a

!

)/(1#b), but a higher amount
q"a

/(1#b), in order to prevent the lender from
taking control of the "rm. This is the expression of
what we have de"ned as liquidity ewect. Second, in
competitive markets (b low) the low-price-big-sales
policy generates an amount of cash high enough to
make liquidity constraints non-binding. In that
case, the liquidity ewect is not shown. We can state
that market ewect outweights liquidity ewect. This is
clari"ed in the following lemma:
Lemma. When the lender requires liquid payments,
(	"0), the entrepreneur dexnes an aggressive
sales policy for low demand shocks (Z

)a

(X

).
This behavior is only present in fragmented-type
markets, with b'bH,1!

/X

. In more
competitive markets, the market structure leads to
a higher sales volume, thus making liquidity ewects
irrelevant.
Proof. See point (3) in the appendix.
3.2.2. Production policy
To compute a "rm's optimal y

amount, we
distinguish two situations (according to the pre-
vious lemma):
3.2.2.1. b)bH (Quite-competitive markets): The
maximization problem is formally identical to the
bank-debt "nancing scenario. The only di!erence is
in the threshold value X

which is given by
expression (8). Making use of the sales policy (7),
production y

is given by
y

"n

[X

]"n

#

X

(a!X

)
(1#b)

(

!

)
with n

[X

],X!
1#b . (11)
From the previous expression, and the assump-
tion made throughout the paper of n

'n

[X

],
we obtain an H

'0. For 

)H

, it is optimal to
produce nothing, and, for 

'H

, we "nd an 

-
increasing production function. The production
function (11) is composed of two terms. The "rst
term n

[X

]!n

is negative, and shows the
remaining stocks once the entrepreneur has satis-
"ed the threshold demand (a

"X

) that secures
his or her control over the "rm. The second term,


X

(a!X

)/(1#b)

(

!

), is a mixture
of di!erent magnitudes that stimulate the "rm's
production. The parameter 

re#ects economic
environment conditions (expansions or recessions).
The expression X

(a!X

)/

balances the mar-
ginal revenues from selling stocks with the mar-
ginal bene"ts from accumulating stocks (

).
Production cost considerations are present in
1/c

,1/(

!

). Finally, 1/(1#b) synthesizes
market structure ewects. In monopolistic environ-
ments (bP1), the optimal level of sales (and pro-
duction) is lower than in competitive markets.
Proposition 2. Market debt-xnanced xrms have on
average a lower stock level than bank debt-xnanced
xrms whenever n

'n[X

], and y is high enough
(n

#y*n,(a!

)/(1#b)). For high values of
debt and low values of 

,
 we xnd that n(

and B are
negatively correlated, as well as stock variation
n(

!n

 and 

. This last correlation only works for
low and high 

values and when n

(n (non-trivial
84 J.A. Tribo& / Int. J. Production Economics 71 (2001) 79}89
case). Both facts suggest the following policy measure
that a Central Authority may adopt in order to smooth
business cycle yuctuations: Reducing the ozcial rates
during recessions so that xrms could renegotiate their
ST debt. This becomes LT debt, payable in future
expansions. This policy will reduce B and raise 

in
a recessive period, and increase B in eventual future
expansive periods.
Proof. See point (4) in the appendix.
When we compare stock #uctuations under both
"nancing scenarios, we see that in recessions, mar-
ket debt-"nanced "rms tend to adjust more their
stocks as they store a lower level of inventories. In
expansions, "rms tend to adjust their stocks less, as
they invest in inventories less strongly than bank
debt-"nanced "rms.
Regarding the relationship between "rms' "nan-
cial structure and "rms' inventory policy, the re-
sults are qualitatively identical to the previous
scenario. The only di!erence is that for high values
of 

, there is a negative correlation between n(

and


. This implies that the reduction of "rms' stock
investments has to be achieved through increases in


. To see this, note that a rise in 

leads to
a reduction in "rm sales and therefore in current
revenues, which are in turn invested in valuable
inventories to be cashed in the future. The point is
that these stocks are perfect substitutes of cash only
under bank "nancing, but not under market "nanc-
ing, as they cannot be used as a means of payment.
We obtain in this way a clear disincentive to reduce
sales to accumulate stocks in the market "nancing
scenario as 

rises. In this case } unlike in the bank
"nancing scenario } a rise in 

is associated with
an increase in the threshold level X

.
Finally, an alternative measure that a Central
Authority can adopt is to promote the use of vari-
able-rate credits. This would also lead a pro"t-
maximizing "rm to smooth its inventory policy. In
recession, rates generally decrease to stimulate the
economy. In expansions, the Central Bank in-
creases interest rates to smooth in#ationary pres-
sure. Within this setting, interest payments will be
lower in recessions (reduction in B), and higher in
expansions (raising "rms' liquidity needs, which
give "rms disincentives to invest strongly in stocks).
3.2.2.2. b'bH: In this case, the maximization
problem faced by the entrepreneur becomes
Max

<

, (12)
<

,
	

R
M 
!cy

!An

!Bda
a
#

	
RM

!cy

!An

#

n

!Bda
a
,
where Z

,X

are given by (10) and (8), R
 
"
(a

!ba

/(1#b)!(1!b)QK ) (a

/(1#b)) and R

"
(a

!b(a

!

)/(1#b)!(1!b)QK )((a

!

)/
(1#b)).
The value function in the interval Z

)a

(X

does not include the term 

n

, because this is the
region where the liquidity ewect is present. More-
over, in this region, the sales policy becomes
q

"a

/(1#b).
By computing the FOC of the problem in (12),
we characterize the optimal production policy
y

as a function of the threshold values Z

and
X

:
y

"n

[X

]!n

#

X

(a!X

)
(1#b)

(

!

)
!X!Z


(1#b)[X!bZ]. (13)
By comparing expressions (13) and (11) we can
see that production in the less competitive scenario
(b'bH) is lower than that obtained in the competi-
tive framework. This is due to the presence of two
factors: "rst, the market structure, which makes
"rms more aggressive in a competitive environ-
ment; and second, the higher threshold-value,
H

(below which the supply shocks lead to a null
production). The analysis of the inventory policy in
this region does not provide new insights with
respect to the previous b-region.
4. Discussion and conclusions
We have studied "rm inventory policy in
an environment with supply and demand shocks,
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taking into consideration di!erent product market
structures as well as "rm "nancial structures. We
have shown that in an expansive (recessive) period,
inventory variance increases (decreases) as markets
become more fragmented.
Concerning "rm "nancial structure, we have
found that market debt-"nanced "rms store a lower
level of inventories than bank debt-"nanced "rms,
which in turn accumulate less than equity-"nanced
"rms. This particular ranking can be explained in
terms of liquidity considerations. Equity-"nanced
"rms do not have liquidity obligations to be satis-
"ed and, during expansions, can invest freely in
illiquid assets such as stocks. This is not the case for
debt-"nanced "rms, especially if debt is short term.
These "rms need to keep a substantial amount of
resources in cash, in order to satisfy their monetary
obligations and avoid liquidation. This fact dis-
courages them from implementing an aggressive
policy of stock accumulation during expansions
and, by the same token, leads to a strong inventory
disinvestment in recessions. Such liquidity ewect is
particularly important for market debt-"nanced
"rms, as they cannot use inventories as a means of
payment. As a consequence, the higher (lower) the
amount of ST debt in expansions (recessions), the
lower stock #uctuations in expansions (recessions)
for a pro"t-maximizing "rm. This in turn implies
that "rms using ST variable-rate credit (more cash
demanding in expansions than in recessions) will
de"ne a smoother inventory policy than those us-
ing "xed-rate credit.
On the basis of the previous analysis, we could
describe a mechanism that stimulates pro"t-maxi-
mizing "rms to smooth their inventory policy while
obtaining `cheapa "nancing. This consists of rais-
ing funds in a recessive period, making use of LT
convertible debt. These bonds would incorporate
two ex-ante conditions: "rst, they must be trans-
formed in equity in the next expansive period, and
second, there must be a "rm commitment to buy
back a certain proportion of this equity. The buy-
back commitment will make this instrument at-
tractive to potential lenders, providing "rms
`cheapa liquidity in recessive periods and avoiding
an inventory overselling. At the same time, the use
of available resources in expansions for the pur-
chase of equities committed ex-ante will prevent
a substantial investment in non liquid assets such
as inventories.
As a "nal remark, an interesting extension to this
model would contemplate issues of aggregation of
"rms' inventory policies across markets subject to
idiosyncratic shocks. This would provide an in-
sightful alternative to the case of common shocks
analyzed in this paper. Such an extension is left for
future research.
Appendix
(1) Derivation of the optimal production policy
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Thus, we can ensure that 
<
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/
y
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for 

0Ny

"0/y for 

0, where y is "rm's
capacity. Therefore y

"(1/

) max0, 

y
(2) Proof of Proposition 1
To determine the relationship between n(

, b,B
and 

, we "rst compute n(

:
n(

"(a!X )
a!a

n

#	y!n[X

]
with n[X

]"1
2
(aN#X

)!

1#b . (A.1)
	"1(0), depending if there is an expansive
(recessive) period.
(2.1) Concerning the relationship between n(

and
B we have dn(

/dB"(
n(

/
X

)
X

/
B. To
compute 
X

/
B, we use expression (3), tak-
ing QK as a constant, as we consider changes in
B for particular "rm, taking other "rms' B as
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constants. The result is 
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We compute 
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From (A.2), and 
X

/
B'0, we can ensure
dn(

/dB(0N lower n(

in equity-"nanced
"rms (B"0); and dn( /dB'( )0 in reces-
sive (expansive) periods, as n(,n(

!n
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is
negative (positive) in the former (latter) periods.
(2.2) To relate n(

with b, we compute dn(
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)
X

/
b#(
n(

/
b)
X

/
b, is ob-
tained under expression (3), assuming a sym-
metric solution QK "q

. In contrast to the
previous point, we cannot take QK as a con-
stant because b a!ects the sales policy of all
"rms. In this case expression (3) becomes
b(X
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)!(1#b)[!
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y
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)n
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Therefore, making use of (A.3), we get
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'n[X
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] ∀X
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allows us to
prove dn(

/db'0Ndn( /db((')0 in re-
cessive (expansive) periods.
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((')0 in recessions (expansions).
(3) Proof of the ¸emma
To prove the lemma, we use expressions (8) and
(10), considering the symmetric solution
q
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"QK "(X

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)/(1#b) for (8) and
q
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/(1#b) for (10). The result is
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As A[X

] and B[Z

] are increasing inX

, and Z

,
respectively, we can ensure that for bbHNX

Z

.
(4) Proof of Proposition 2
(1) To prove that the inventory level in market
debt-"nanced "rms is lower than in bank debt-
"nanced "rms we look at expressions (A.3) and
(A.5), which de"ne X

and X

. (upper index
M(B) for market (bank) "nancing scenario):
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*y (see (5) and (11)), 
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Eq. (11) allows us to de"ne 

, as the value of


such that y"y . Thus, for 

)0 ('

)
Ny"y"0 (y ), and we can apply (A.2) to
(A.8) to obtain n( 

(n( 

.
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For 0(
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, a continuity
argument ensures
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(2) The second issue to study is the relationship
between n( 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and B.
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Deriving this expression we get
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Eq. (A.11) is negative by (A.9), which combined
with 
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